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Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty




In the 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia,1 the United States
Supreme Court found that executing a mentally retarded person is
excessive punishment; consequently, the Court held that
condemning such individuals to death violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 2 The Court explained that there is a
societal consensus that mentally retarded criminals are less
culpable than other criminals, as demonstrated by the trend
amongst states to legislate against executing the mentally
retarded. 3  Additionally, the two key rationales for capital
punishment-retribution and deterrence-do not apply with the
same force to mentally retarded offenders as they do to those
without mental retardation. 4 Finally, Atkins found that mentally
retarded people often face a greater risk of execution for crimes
they did not commit than those who are not mentally retarded. A
variety of causes attributed to their impairment could make
mentally retarded defendants more likely to be wrongfully
convicted, including a false confession, an inability to assist
counsel, being a poor witness, and appearing unremorseful to the
jury. 5
Despite recognizing that disagreement results when courts
must determine whether an individual is in fact mentally
t. J.D. expected 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2005,
University of Minnesota.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Id. at 321.
3. Id. at 315-16 (noting the "consistency of the direction of change" amongst
the states toward legislating against executing the mentally retarded).
4. Id. at 319-20 (noting that "the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution [the death penalty]," and
that "executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of
deterrence").
5. Id. at 321 ('Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special
risk of wrongful execution.").
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retarded, 6 the Atkins Court did not articulate a test or procedure
for states to follow in order to implement its decision that mentally
retarded people must not be sentenced to death. 7 The Atkins
Court left each state on its own to solve the problems presented by
the holding-from formulating a definition of mental retardation
to determining the applicable burden of proof and upon whom that
burden falls.8 As a result, amongst the states there is neither a
uniform definition of mental retardation nor a uniform procedure
for determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, 9 and
some state legislatures have declined to act on this issue at all. 10
This Article compares the responses of three states to the
Atkins decision, highlighting inconsistencies in the qualifications
for mental retardation and in the processes courts use to
determine mental retardation. These variations demonstrate the
central flaw in the Atkins decision: the Court merely pointed out a
constitutional violation without providing guidelines to ensure
that such violations cease. Atkins failed to ensure protection from
a death sentence for those who do not meet the culpability
requirements for execution. As a result, states may still perform
unconstitutional executions.
By leaving states the tasks of defining mental retardation
and implementing procedures for determining whether a
defendant is mentally retarded, the Atkins Court merely
recognized a constitutional violation without providing either a
remedy or a way to prevent further violations. In order to give
bite to the Atkins holding, states should work from the same
substantive definitions of mental retardation and follow uniform
procedures for determining mental retardation. Uniformity is
important because a ruling on mental retardation determines the
death penalty's availability. Suggested considerations for a
suitable rule include: examining factors indicative of the
defendant's culpability in addition to mental retardation,
eliminating age of onset requirements, complying with
constitutional requirements for sentencing determinations
6. Id. at 317.
7. Id. ("As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), with
regard to insanity, 'we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."').
8. See id.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See, e.g., Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("In the
three legislative sessions since Atkins, the Texas Legislature has not established a
statutory scheme for the presentation and determination of an issue of mental
retardation in a capital murder trial. In the absence of legislative action, this
Court has formulated temporary judicial guidelines in addressing Atkins claims.").
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(including the applicable burden of proof), determining mental
retardation pre-trial, and ensuring that intelligence quotient (IQ)
test scores are not given too much weight in mental retardation
determinations.
Part I of this Article provides background to place the Atkins
decision in context, including a general discussion of executing the
mentally retarded, a comparison of common definitions of mental
retardation, a brief examination of the rationale for inflicting the
death penalty as described in Atkins, and a synopsis of case law
leading to the Atkins decision. Part II provides a detailed
description of the Atkins holding and reasoning. Part III compares
the methods used by Texas, New Jersey, and Louisiana in capital
cases to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded.
Part IV concludes that due to deficiencies in the Atkins decision
itself, the current impementations of the Atkins holding by the
states are insufficient to safeguard against constitutional
violations. Part IV also addresses proposed solutions to this
problem, suggesting components of a sufficient "Atkins" rule.
I. The Setting of Atkins
A. Executing the Mentally Retarded
Since reinstating the death penalty in 1976,11 the United
States has executed at least thirty-three mentally retarded men. 12
Some estimate that over three hundred mentally retarded men
and women currently sit on death rows across America. 13 One
man named Earl Washington sat on death row for sixteen years
after police convinced him to confess to a crime he did not
commit. 14 Mr. Washington had an IQ of sixty-nine, 15 which falls
in the range of mentally retarded. 16 Fortunately, DNA tests
confirmed Washington's innocence before his death sentence was
11. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12. Jamie Fellner, Mentally Retarded Don't Belong on Death Row, S. F. CHRON.,
Jan. 1, 2004, at A19, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2000/O1/04/usdom 12804.htm (noting that it is likely that
this number is actually greater, because this number represents only those
executed who are known to have been mentally retarded).
13. Id. (citing expert estimates that 10-15% of the over 3,000 inmates currently
on death row are mentally retarded).
14. See Death Penalty Information Center, Earl Washington, IQ of 69,
Confessed to a Crime He Did Not Commit,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/mental-retardation-and-death-penalty (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008) (discussing Mr. Washington's innocence).
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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carried out, and he received an absolute pardon. 17
The United States is in the global minority by continuing to
impose the death penalty at all-let alone on mentally retarded
individuals. 18 Before his retirement, Supreme Court Justice
Blackmun noted that, "[t]aking international law seriously where
the death penalty is concerned draws into question the United
States' entire capital punishment enterprise." 19  While sixty
countries retain the death penalty, the number currently carrying
out executions is much lower.20 The United States executed the
fifth highest number of people per country in 2007, behind only
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. 21 These five countries
carried out eighty-eight percent of all known executions that
year.22
In Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that, "within the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved."23 The countries in the European Union voiced their
interest in protecting the mentally retarded from execution in a
brief as amicus curiae supporting Atkins, stating that the United
States' practice of allowing the mentally retarded to be executed is
at odds with the practice of other countries throughout the
world.24 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights also
17. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 14.
18. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST
COUNTRIES, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-
countries (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (noting that 137 (over two-thirds) of the
world's countries "have now abolished the death penalty in law or practice").
19. Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2002).
20. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18 (noting that of the sixty
retentionist countries, thirty-five "can be considered abolitionist in practice in that
they have not executed anyone during the past 10 years and are believed to have a
policy or established practice of not carrying out executions").
21. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2007
6 (2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT50/0O1/20O8/en/
b43ale5b-ffea-1ldc-b092-bdbO2O6l7d3d/act5000l2008eng.pdf.
22. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/numbers (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citation omitted).
24. United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, McCarver v. North Carolina,
No. 00-8727, 2001 WL 648609, at *2 (noting that "[t]here is a growing international
consensus against the execution of persons with mental retardation"); see Atkins v.
Virginia, 534 U.S. 1053 (2001) (granting motion to consider amicus briefs filed in
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) on behalf of the petitioner in
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)); see also European Union, Delegation of the
European Commission to the USA, EU Policy on the Death Penalty,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/eumemorandum.htm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2008) (explaining that executing those with any form of mental disorder is
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encourages countries to refrain from imposing the death penalty
on those with any form of mental disability.25  Other groups
demonstrated their opposition to the execution of mentally
retarded individuals by filing amicus curiae briefs in Atkins,
including the American Psychological Association, the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), 26 and the United
States Catholic Conference. 27
B. Essential Components of Common Definitions of Mental
Retardation
According to the Supreme Court, the AAMR is "the country's
oldest and largest organization of professionals working with the
mentally retarded." 28  The Supreme Court has cited the AAMR
definition of mental retardation when determining whether a
defendant is mentally retarded for purposes of the death penalty.
29
The Court also offered the American Psychiatric Association's
definition of mental retardation, 30 observing that it was "similar"
to that of the AAMR. 31 While the precise wording may differ, most
definitions of mental retardation contain three common elements:
limited intellectual functioning, limited adaptive behavior, and an
onset before age eighteen. 32
Limited intellectual functioning is often measured by the
standardized Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test. 33 A score of seventy
or below, which is two standard deviations below the mean,
indicates significantly limited intellectual functioning; 34 however,
"contrary to internationally recognised human rights norms and neglect[s] the
dignity and worth of the human person").
25. See Sandra Babcock, The Global Debate on the Death Penalty, Z NET, Dec.
12, 2007, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/15845.
26. The American Association on Mental Retardation is now the American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). See generally
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,
http://www.aamr.org or http://www.aaidd.org. This Article uses both names in
order to be consistent with the source or time period.
27. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (listing amicus curiae briefs).
28. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing the 1992 definition of mental retardation
from the AAMR, which is now the AAIDD).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., American Association of Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities, Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD
Definition, http://www.aamr.org/content_185.cfm?navID=62 (last visited Dec. 17,





due to the margin of error in IQ tests, an individual with mental
retardation may score as high as seventy-five. 35 An IQ score
alone, whether above or below seventy, is not indicative of the
existence of mental retardation or the lack thereof: one must also
examine the individual's adaptive behavior. 36
Adaptive behavior is measured by testing the conceptual,
social, and practical skills that individuals use in everyday life. 37
Significantly limited adaptive behavior is characterized by test
scores two standard deviations below the mean on any one area of
conceptual, social, or practical skills, or on an average of all
three.38  This element addresses the requirement that the
intellectual impairment has produced real-world disabling effects,
not merely a low IQ. 39
Some, but not all, definitions of mental retardation for legal
purposes require that the age of onset be under eighteen; others
require manifestation before the age of twenty-two, or during the
developmental period; a few definitions have no age requirement
at all.40 The primary purpose of the age of onset requirement "is
to distinguish mental retardation from other forms of brain
damage that may occur later in life, such as traumatic head injury
or dementia caused by disease, illness, or similar conditions."41
While these distinctions may be important for diagnosis and
treatment, 42 they should not bear on a defendant's eligibility for
35. See Definition of Mental Retardation,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20174 (last visited Nov.
11, 2007) [hereinafter Definition] (noting that a score below seventy to seventy-five
on the IQ test is considered mental retardation).
36. See AAIDD FAQ supra note 32.
37. See id. (listing examples of conceptual skills such as reading, writing, and
money concepts; social skills such as responsibility, gullibility, nalvet6, following
rules, obeying laws, and avoiding victimization; and practical skills, including daily
living skills, such as eating, dressing, preparing meals, and occupational skills).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, State Statutes Prohibiting the
Death Penalty for People with Mental Retardation,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=138&scid= (last visited Sept. 28,
2008) (noting that New Mexico and Nebraska have no age of onset requirement;
Colorado, Connecticut, and Georgia use the developmental period (as defined by
each state); Indiana and Maryland use age twenty-two).
41. Attorney William D. Matthewman, Comment to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.203 and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.142 (proposed),
Supreme Court of Florida Case No. SC 03-685 2 (June 2003),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/comments/2003/O3685_CommentsMatthe
wman.pdf.
42. See Definition, supra note 35.
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the death penalty. 43 Individuals with significant deficiencies in
mental functioning, regardless of the underlying cause, lack the
level of culpability that is required to impose a death sentence.
44
C. Rationale for Inflicting the Death Penalty
One goal of inflicting capital punishment is retribution.
45
The theory of retribution is based on the idea that the level of the
offender's culpability should dictate the severity of the
punishment. 46 In determining whether an individual's behavior
meets the level of culpability warranting the death penalty, courts
have considered four principles: whether the offender acted
"rationally, purposefully, and deliberately"; the capacity of the
individual to understand the consequences of his actions; whether
the individual is able to behave as a "responsible, mature citizen";
and the level of personal responsibility of the individual.
47
A second goal of capital punishment is deterrence, 48 based
upon the idea that more severe punishments will prevent potential
criminals from carrying out the wrongful conduct that triggered
the punishment. 49 Due to this cause and effect relationship,
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when the criminal
engages in premeditation and deliberation of his or her crime. 50
D. Case Law Leading to Atkins
In the 1989 case Penry v. Lynaugh,51 the Supreme Court
denied an Eighth Amendment challenge to the application of the
death penalty to mentally retarded people. 52 The defense argued
that it was cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally
retarded person like Penry, who had the mental capacity of a
seven-year-old child.53 Further, the defense urged the Court to
take the view that mentally retarded people cannot possess the
43. See generally Matthewman, supra note 41 at 2-3 (arguing that the age of
onset requirement should be abandoned when determining mental retardation of
defendants in potential capital trials).
44. Id.
45. Joanna Hall, Atkins v. Virginia: National Consensus or Six-Person
Opinion?, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 361, 376 (2004).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 376-77.
48. Id. at 376.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
52. Id. at 340.
53. Id. at 328.
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requisite level of culpability for a death sentence, and claimed that
there was an "emerging national consensus" against executing
mentally retarded people. 54 The Court, however, did not want to
prohibit the punishment for an entire class of defendants, 55 and
did not find sufficient evidence of a nationwide opposition to the
practice to hold that it was excessive punishment. 56
In a 1980 decision, Godfrey v. Georgia,57 the Supreme Court
discussed the necessity of finding that a defendant has higher
moral culpability than an average criminal in order for the death
penalty to be imposed. 58 The Court found that the petitioner's
crimes did not reflect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved'
than that of any person guilty of murder," and consequently
Godfrey could not be executed. 59 Godfrey solidified the important
notion that the death penalty must be triggered by something
about the offense or the offender that is sufficient to distinguish
the situation from that in which the death penalty is not
imposed. 60
In the 1986 case Ford v. Wainwright,61 the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from
executing an insane person.62 The Court formally recognized its
longstanding principle that it is wrong to execute someone who,
because of a mental illness, does not understand the justifications
for the death penalty or its implications. 63 The decision, however,
largely left "to the State the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of
sentences."
64
54. Id. at 328-29.
55. See id. at 338-39 (arguing that differences in experience and capabilities
among mentally retarded people make categorical exclusion of them from the death
penalty inappropriate).
56. Id. at 335 ("But at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses
for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.").
57. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
58. See id. at 427-33 (stating that crimes deserving the death penalty must be
distinguished from other crimes by factors including the "depravity of mind" of the
defendant).
59. Id. at 433.
60. Id. at 427 ("A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a
'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976))).
61. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
62. Id. at 410.
63. Id. at 417.
64. Id. at 416-17.
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One of the few instructions provided in the Ford opinion was
that the procedures used by the states should further the goal of
reaching a fair assessment of the defendant's mental state. 65 The
Ford Court also advised the states to place as few restrictions as
possible on the adversarial presentation of information relating to
the defendant's mental state, stressing the need for accuracy in
the factfinding determination. 66 The Court found it important
that any state procedure allow the prisoner to participate in the
process used to determine sanity by giving the defense the
opportunity to present all relevant evidence in an adversarial
proceeding. 67 The Court also stressed that it is important for the
factfinder to consider multiple expert psychiatric opinions when
determining issues of mental state.6 8 The defendant must also be
allowed to challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrist's
conclusions and methods.6 9  Lastly, the determination of a
defendant's sanity should not be left to the executive branch,
which does not have the necessary neutrality for such
factfinding. 70  These procedural requirements stem from the
Court's "heightened concern for fairness and accuracy." 71
II. Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that executing
a mentally retarded criminal is excessive punishment, and thus
the practice violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of
65. Id. at 417 ("Yet the lodestar of any effort to devise a procedure must be the
overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those with substantial claims
and of encouraging accuracy in the factfinding determination.").
66. Id. (arguing that the "high stakes" and "imprecise" evidence involved in
these cases create the need for unrestricted presentation of evidence, noting that
"[ult is all the more important that the adversary presentation of relevant
information be as unrestricted as possible").
67. See id. at 413-14 (noting that all other proceedings leading up to the
determination of a death penalty require the submission of all relevant
information, so it "would be odd were [the court] now to abandon [its] insistence
upon unfettered presentation of relevant information, before the final fact
antecedent to execution has been found").
68. Id. at 414 ("[W]ithout any adversarial assistance from the prisoner's
representative-especially when the psychiatric opinion he proffers is based on
much more extensive evaluation than that of the state-appointed commission-the
factfinder loses the substantial benefit of potentially probative information. The
result is a much greater likelihood of an erroneous decision.").
69. Id. at 415.
70. Id. at 416 ("Perhaps the most striking defect in the [Florida] procedures ...
is the State's placement of the decision wholly within the executive branch .... The
commander of the State's corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality
that is necessary for reliability in the factfinding proceeding.").
71. Id. at 414.
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the Eighth Amendment. 72 The Atkins Court declared that "death
is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal,"
and that the mentally retarded should be categorically excluded
from execution. 73
The existence of state legislative action on this issue strongly
influenced the Supreme Court's finding.74 A claim that
punishment is excessive is judged by today's standards rather
than any historical views on the subject, 75 and the "clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."7 6 The Court
observed a change since this issue was last brought to its
attention: many state legislatures began banning the execution of
mentally retarded individuals. 77  Such legislative action
demonstrated to the Court an evolving public view that executing
mentally retarded people is a punishment not proportional to their
offense. 7s The Court was not concerned with the exact number of
states that had enacted legislation in this area, but instead with
the obvious trend against executing the mentally retarded. 79
Because the Supreme Court could find no valid reason to disagree
with the judgment of the people as demonstrated through state
legislatures, a majority of the Justices determined that executing
mentally retarded people is excessive punishment.8 0
In determining whether to agree with the legislative trend,
the Atkins Court discussed several factors. First, the Court found
that mentally retarded criminals should not be immune from
punishment, but should not be sentenced to death because they
are less personally culpable than the average person is.81 The
reduced personal culpability is the result of the impairments of
mentally retarded persons, including "diminished capacities to
72. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
73. Id. at 320.
74. See id. at 311-12 (stating that the proportionality of punishment should be
determined by current societal standards, which are clearly demonstrated by
current legislation).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 312 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
77. Id. at 314-15.
78. See id. at 316 ("The practice [of executing the mentally retarded], therefore,
has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it.").
79. Id. at 315 ("It is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.").
80. Id. at 321.
81. Id. at 318 ('Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal
sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.").
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understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others."8 2 These disabilities cause a mentally retarded person to
be unable to "act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct,"8 3 for which
the death penalty is deemed acceptable.8 4 It would be inconsistent
to inflict the death penalty on a mentally retarded criminal when
the culpability of the average murderer does not warrant the
death penalty.85
A second factor resulting in the Court's agreement with the
legislative trend toward banning the execution of the mentally
retarded is that the common justifications for the death penalty do
not apply to mentally retarded people.8 6 The social purposes of the
death penalty are "retribution and deterrence of capital crimes." 87
Society's interest in retribution is closely tied to the culpability of
the offender.88 Since the impairments of mentally retarded people
make them unable to act with the high level of culpability required
in order to inflict the death penalty,8 9 society has no reasonable
interest in seeing the death penalty imposed on the mentally
retarded.90
Society also does not experience a measurable deterrence
benefit from executing mentally retarded criminals. 91 The same
impairments that make the mentally retarded less morally
culpable also reduce their ability to reason in the ways necessary
to control their behavior based on the possibility of execution. 92
Capital punishment is an effective deterrent "only when murder is
the result of premeditation and deliberation."93  Therefore,
executing mentally retarded criminals who are incapable of these
reasoning processes does not further society's interest in the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 306.
84. See id. at 311 (noting that punishment should be proportional to the
offense).
85. See id. at 319.
86. Id. at 318-19.
87. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 306.
90. See id. at 319 (arguing that the death penalty is "purposeless" unless it
accomplishes either deterrence or retribution).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 320.
93. Id. at 319 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982)).
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deterrence of capital crimes. 94
Finally, the Atkins court noted that "[m]entally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution." 95  Many aspects of the defense could be adversely
affected by the fact that the defendant is mentally retarded.
Mentally retarded defendants may have problems assisting their
counsel, are usually poor witnesses, and can appear to lack
remorse. 96 This makes demonstrating mitigating circumstances
difficult when the prosecution demonstrates aggravating factors.
97
Attempting to show mental retardation as a mitigating
circumstance can actually increase the likelihood that the jury will
find that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness exists.98
Additionally, mentally retarded people are in greater danger of
giving false confessions. 99 These factors led the Court to the
conclusion that the enhanced risk that a mentally retarded person
will be executed weighs in favor of a formal ban on their
execution. 100
After determining that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals is an Eighth Amendment violation, the Atkins Court
explicitly stated that it would leave the difficult task of enforcing
its holding to the states. 101 While it explained that potentially
serious complications arise when trying to determine whether a
defendant is in fact mentally retarded, 102 the opinion did not give
much guidance to states on how to approach the issue. The Court
observed that the existing statutory definitions of mental
retardation, while not identical, are generally similar to the AAMR
and the American Psychiatric Association definitions cited earlier
in the opinion. 103 Most significantly, procedural aspects of
enforcing the Atkins holding-such as the point in the proceedings
94. Id. at 320 ("[E]xecuting the mentally retarded will not measurably further
the goal of deterrence.").
95. Id. at 321.
96. Id. at 320-21.
97. Id. at 320.
98. Id. at 321.
99. Id. at 320.
100. Id. at 320-21.
101. Id. at 317 ("[W]e leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986))).
102. Id. ('CTo the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact
retarded.").
103. Id. at 317 n.22; see also supra Part I.B. (discussing definitions of mental
retardation).
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at which the issue of mental retardation should be addressed, how
to determine if the defendant is mentally retarded, whether the
issue must be presented to a jury, the applicable burden, and upon
whom that burden falls-were not discussed. 104
III. State Response to Atkins: Highlighting Texas, New
Jersey, and Louisiana
A. Texas
Texas has not yet passed legislation establishing substantive
and procedural mechanisms for implementing the Atkins
holding. 105 As a result, in Ex parte Briseno,106 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals created its own test, noting its departure from
the normal practice of deferring to legislative action because the
Texas legislature had yet to act on the Atkins decision. 0 7 In
settling on the applicable definition of mental retardation, the
Briseno court noted that the parties had all used the same AAMR
definition, which lawmakers also relied on in the Texas Health
and Safety Code. 108 Thus, until further legislation was passed, the
court adopted the AAMR and Health and Safety Code definition of
mental retardation for use in capital sentencing. 0 9 However, this
definition of mental retardation had been evolving for sixty-five
years prior to the decision, and was likely to continue to evolve,
104. Id. at 317.
105. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("In the three
legislative sessions since Atkins, the Texas Legislature has not established a
statutory scheme for the presentation and determination of an issue of mental
retardation in a capital murder trial.").
106. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
107. Id. at 4-5. The court stated that it:
does not, under normal circumstances, create law .... Nonetheless,
this Court must now deal with a significant number of pending habeas
corpus applications claiming that the death row inmate suffers from
mental retardation and thus is exempt from execution. Recognizing
that "justice delayed is justice denied" to the inmate, to the victims
and their families, and to society at large, we must act during this
legislative interregnum to provide the bench and bar with temporary
judicial guidelines in addressing Atkins claims.
Id.
108. Id. at 7-8.
109. Id. at 7. The AAMR defined mental retardation as "a disability
characterized by: (1) 'significantly subaverage' general intellectual functioning; (2)
accompanied by 'related' limitations in adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which
occurs prior to the age of 18." Id. "[T]he definition under the Texas Health and
Safety Code is similar: 'mental retardation' means significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and
originates during the developmental period." Id.
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making this a temporary fix. 110
The Briseno opinion made it clear that in Texas, the ultimate
determination of a defendant's mental retardation should be made
by the factfinder, not by experts in the field. 1 Amazingly, the
court held that psychological diagnostic criteria do not necessarily
determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive
punishment. 1 2 Although the Briseno opinion applied the AAMR
definition of mental retardation, the court pointed out that, often,
the legal definition of a medical term does not match that in the
field of psychiatry.1 13 The court found the adaptive behavior
criteria in the AAMR definition to be "exceedingly subjective," and
found fault in the use of that definition because each side could
simply retain experts who would give weight to their view. 114 To
further its goal of giving the court leeway in determinations of
mental retardation, the Texas court created a test that gives little,
if any, weight to experts in the field of mental retardation.
Instead, it instructs finders of fact to examine additional factors-
which were invented by the court without any basis in scientific
literature or evidence regarding mental retardation-in order to
determine if the evidence indicates that the defendant is mentally
retarded."1
110. Id. at 8 n.29.
111. Id. at 9; see also id. at 9 n.30.
112. Id. at 9. The court stated that:
Although experts may offer insightful opinions on the question of
whether a particular person meets the psychological diagnostic
criteria for mental retardation, the ultimate issue of whether this
person is, in fact, mentally retarded for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment ban on excessive punishment is one for the finder of fact,
based upon all of the evidence and determinations of credibility.
Id.
113. Id. at 8 n.28.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 8-9. The court listed seven factors:
Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-
his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was
mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?[; h]as the person formulated plans and carried them
through or is his conduct impulsive?[; d]oes his conduct show
leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?[; is his
conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate,
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?[; d]oes he respond
coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do
his responses wander from subject to subject?[; clan the person hide
facts or lie effectively in his own or others' interests?[; and p]utting
aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital
offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought,
planning, and complex execution of purpose?
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The Briseno court also found that an applicant is not entitled
to a jury review on a post-conviction habeas corpus review of an
Atkins claim. 116 Support for this decision was found in the fact
that the majority of states statutorily prohibiting execution of
mentally retarded criminals left the finding of mental retardation
to a judge rather than a jury, 1 7 and the Atkins court left the
enforcement of its holding to the states." 8 In a 2007 decision,
Gallo v. State,119 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals extended
this holding, expressly stating that a jury determination is not
required when an Atkins issue is presented at trial. 1
20
Lastly, Briseno held that in a habeas corpus proceeding, the
applicant bears the burden of proof to show that he is mentally
retarded by a preponderance of the evidence. 121  The court
reasoned that the issue of mental retardation was analogous to an
affirmative defense, and thus the burden should be the same.
122
As additional support, the court pointed out that at the time of the
decision, twelve of the nineteen states that statutorily prohibited
execution of mentally retarded individuals placed a similar burden
on the defendant. 123 Accordingly, under the Briseno test, an
applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and
significant limitations in adaptive functioning. 124 In the 2007
Gallo decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made it clear
that the defendant also bears the burden of proving mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence when the Atkins
issue is raised at trial. 125 By placing a very difficult burden of
proof on the defendant and inventing factors which purportedly
indicate lack of mental retardation, the Texas courts created a
procedure for determining mental retardation that is sufficiently
Id.
116. Id. at 11 ("Thus, we hold that, when an inmate sentenced to death files a
habeas corpus application raising a cognizable Atkins claim, the factual merit of
that claim should be determined by the judge of the convicting court.").
117. Id. at 10 (citing State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 & n.35 (La. 2002)).
118. See id. at 10-11 (arguing that the Supreme Court's failure to reject existing
state practices indicates no preference for a jury determination of mental
retardation).
119. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
120. Id. at 770 ("Although a jury determined the issue of mental retardation in
this case, it is important to note at the outset that a jury determination of mental
retardation is not required.").
121. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 770.
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lax to allow judges to continue to sentence mentally retarded
individuals to death.
B. New Jersey
In 2005, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey found that the burden was on the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury that the defendant was not mentally
retarded-seemingly a step towards justice for mentally retarded
offenders.126 The Appellate Division found that a claim of mental
retardation was similar to a claim of diminished capacity, which
meant that the defendant lacked the capacity to form the required
mens rea.127 Portions of that holding, however, were reversed the
following year when the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "the
defendant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is retarded."'128 The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that mental retardation was more similar to insanity than
diminished capacity, in that the person's punishment is reduced
even though they may have had the required mental state. 129 The
court supported its decision to place the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence on the defendant with the
observation that, of all the states to address the issue, all but six
place that burden on the defendant.130 The New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the jury should
determine the existence of mental retardationl31 after the guilt-
phase of the trial, but before the penalty-phase begins. 132
However, if the existence of mental retardation is so evident that
"reasonable minds could not differ," the judge should make a
determination pre-trial. 133
Justice Albin's dissent to the majority opinion of the New
126. State v. Jimenez (Jimenez I1), 908 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2006) (citing State v.
Jimenez (Jimenez 1), 880 A.2d 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)).
127. Id. at 191.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 188-89 ("[Flive states use the clear and convincing evidence
standard.., and one state-Georgia-mandates that a defendant prove his or her
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt.").
131. Id. at 189 (noting that "[iun most jurisdictions, a judge serves as the
factfinder on the mental retardation question, whereas in a minority ofjurisdictions the Atkins determination is left to the jury"). In a subsequent motion
to clarify, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if a single juror is satisfied that
the defendant has met his burden of proving mental retardation then the defendant
is ineligible to receive the death penalty. State v. Jimenez (Jimenez IIM), 924 A.2d
513, 514 (N.J. 2007).
132. Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 191-92.
133. Id. at 192.
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Jersey Supreme Court is noteworthy for his belief that "[b]y
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, the majority
unnecessarily, and in my opinion unconstitutionally, increases the
likelihood of wrongly executing a mentally retarded person."'
134
The dissent analogized the issue of mental retardation to self-
defense rather than to the insanity defense, saying that once the
defendant raises the issue, the State has the burden of proof.
135
Because he believed lack of mental retardation to be a
constitutional prerequisite for execution (rather than a statutory
defense, such as insanity), Justice Albin thought that the State
should be required to prove the absence of mental retardation
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sentence a defendant to
death. 136
C. Louisiana
The 2006 case State v. Turner137 presented a challenge to the
constitutionality of Louisiana's statute outlining a procedure for
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded. 138 In
Turner, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
opinion, which had analogized the issue of mental retardation to
competency to stand trial. 139  The Louisiana legislature had
equated the issue of mental retardation with the insanity defense
and delegated the determination of mental retardation to the
jury. 140 The trial court felt that this would violate the defendant's
due process and Eighth Amendment rights, and held that a judge,
rather than a jury should make the determination of mental
retardation. 141
The Louisiana Supreme Court suggested that one factor in
the trial court's decision was that juries are unreliable because
they might view the defendant's low IQ as indicative of future
dangerousness, which would unjustly sway the jury against a
finding of mental retardation. 42  The trial court was also
concerned that jurors who are asked to determine whether a
134. Id. at 193 (Albin, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 194-95.
136. Id. at 195.
137. State v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89 (La. 2006).
138. Id. at 92-93.
139. Id. at 96.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 97.
142. Id. ("Thus, the defendant's mental retardation was a two-edged sword: it
may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates there is a
probability he will be dangerous in the future .... ")
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defendant is mentally retarded might come to their conclusion by
weighing the issue of mental retardation against other factors,
rather than making an independent determination as required. 143
In these ways, juries have the potential to be dangerously
unpredictable when given the task of determining the existence of
mental retardation in a capital defendant.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that scholars and
courts had these and other concerns about delegating the issue of
mental retardation to jurors at'the penalty phase of the trial.144
The Turner court itself noted another potential difficulty with
jurors determining the existence of mental retardation at the
penalty phase of the trial: the issue of mental retardation is not
similar to other mitigating or aggravating factors that may be
found by the jury because, if found, mental retardation completely
bars the imposition of the death sentence. 145 Nonetheless, in
upholding the statutory procedure for determining mental
retardation of a capital defendant, the Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the trial court's belief that a jury was unreliable in
making the determination of mental retardation. 146
In sum, Louisiana statutorily requires the defendant to raise
the issue of mental retardation in a pre-trial proceeding, and also
requires the defendant to prove mental retardation to the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 47 Interestingly, this is to take
place at the capital sentencing hearing along with all other
sentencing issues, even though the court recognized the difference
between the issue of mental retardation and other sentencing
factors. 148
143. Id. at 98-99 ("[P]lacing the Atkins mental retardation determination within
the punishment proceeding could be confusing to jurors who might misconstrue it
as interrelated with the culpability issues before them or otherwise be balanced
with or against such issues." (quoting Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:
Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and Excluding them from Execution, 30 J.
LEGIs. 77, 109 (2003))).
144. Id. at 98 ("We are aware that both commentators and jurists have
expressed serious reservations about jurors deciding the issue of mental
retardation at the penalty phase of capital trials."); see also id. at 99 (noting that
courts have expressed "concern about jurors' determination of mental retardation,
during punishment phase, being improperly influenced by evidence that can only
improperly appeal to jurors' emotions and passions").
145. Id. at 98 ("Thus, mental retardation is not a factor to be weighed in thejury's balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in sentencing, but is an
absolute bar to capital punishment.").
146. Id. at 97-98 ("We find nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion to support a
determination that a jury is unreliable for deciding the factual issue of whether the
defendant is mentally retarded.").
147. Id. at 93.
148. Id.
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IV. Deficiencies in the Atkins Rule and Suggested
Modifications to Further the Goal of Eliminating
Constitutional Violations
By leaving the task of defining mental retardation and
implementing procedures for determining whether a defendant is
mentally retarded to the states, the Atkins Court merely
recognized a constitutional violation without providing a remedy
or a means to prevent further violations from continuing.
A. Inconsistencies Between the State Solutions Illustrate
The Need For a Uniform Standard
Texas, Louisiana, and New Jersey demonstrate significant
differences in the ways that the states have implemented the
Supreme Court's holding in Atkins v. Virginia. Texas and New
Jersey use court-created rules, whereas Louisiana enacted a
statute on the subject. 149  In each of those three states, the
definition of mental retardation requires significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, limitations in adaptive functioning, as
well as an onset prior to age eighteen. 150 In Texas, the judge
makes the determination, 151 whereas in New Jersey and Louisiana
this is the jury's responsibility. 52  Contrary to the other two
states, judges in Texas are specifically instructed not to rely on
experts. 53 All three states agree that the defendant has the
burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the
evidence.i54 The courts in these states have analogized mental
retardation to an affirmative defense,"55 competency to stand
trial,15 6 the insanity defense, 157 and diminished capacity,
15
149. For a discussion of the specific tests and procedures used in Texas, New
Jersey, and Louisiana, see supra Part III.
150. See State v. Jimenez (Jimenez 11), 908 A.2d 181, 184 n.3 (N.J. 2006); State
v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 106 (La. 2006); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004).
151. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 9.
152. See Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 192 (holding that the judge determines the
issue only "if reasonable minds could not differ"); Turner, 936 So.2d at 96 (noting
that the Louisiana legislature delegated the determination of mental retardation to
the jury, but also noting that the court would prefer a judge make the
determination of mental retardation pretrial).
153. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas
courts' refusal to rely on experts).
154. See Jimenez I, 908 A.2d at 190; Turner, 936 So.2d at 93; Briseno, 135
S.W.3d at 12.
155. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 12.
156. See Turner, 936 So.2d at 96.
157. See Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 191.
158. See id. (citing State v. Jimenez (Jimenez 1), 880 A.2d 468 (N. J. Super. Ct.
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demonstrating significant variation in approaches to mental
retardation.
These differences demonstrate the wide array of approaches
states have taken to mental retardation in capital cases. Due to
the many discrepancies, it is possible that the same person could
be found mentally retarded in one state, but not in another. For
example, an individual whose IQ score sits just above the level of
mental retardation may not be viewed as mentally retarded by a
judge in Texas who does not consult experts and instead looks at
court-created factors.159 Then again, an expert in the field of
mental retardation may explain to a jury in Louisiana or New
Jersey that, despite the IQ score, other factors indicate that the
defendant is mentally retarded, and the jury could then find the
same defendant mentally retarded. 160 These differing procedural
approaches could result in contradictory rulings on mental
retardation. This produces an undesirable state of affairs,
considering the result for the unlucky defendant is death. A
solution to this problem is to set out a single standardized
approach for courts to follow when faced with determining if a
defendant is mentally retarded.
B. The Atkins Decision Was Deficient Because it Failed to
Provide the States With a Single Substantive Definition
of Mental Retardation
The Texas courts have decided not to rely solely on the
guidelines of any existing definition of mental retardation, but
rather to write their own criteria for determining the existence of
adaptive limitations. 161 Such arbitrary rules are a direct result of
a flaw in the Atkins decision: leaving the substantive issues
involved in determining a defendant's mental retardation to the
states. 162 Atkins gives too much deference to the states' preferred
definitions of mental retardation, resulting in inconsistency.
Rather than merely citing the AAMR and American Psychological
Society in passing as examples of definitions of mental
retardation, 163 the Atkins Court should have clearly formulated a
definition for the states to use in evaluating defendants' claims of
App. Div. 2005)).
159. See supra notes 112, 115 and accompanying text.
160. See Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 184 n.3 (noting that persons with IQ scores just
over 70 might be mentally retarded); Turner, 936 So.2d at 93-94 (setting no explicit
IQ requirements and allowing expert evidence in determining mental retardation).
161. See supra note 115 (listing the Texas court's recommended factors).
162. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
163. See id. at 317 n.22.
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mental retardation based on a uniform standard.
The inclusion, or lack thereof, of an age of onset requirement
also results in discrepancies among state definitions of mental
retardation. Setting inconsistencies between state rules aside, in
order to hold true to the constitutional requirements of Atkins,
states should not adhere to requirements for the age of onset of
mental retardation. First, the Atkins Court focused on the fact
that the traditional justifications of punishment-retribution and
deterrence-do not apply to mentally retarded people due to their
limitations in intellectual functioning.16 4 When a defendant has
significant limitations in intelligence and adaptive behavior, an
additional finding that those limitations did not manifest before
age eighteen does not lessen their effect on the defendant.
165
Mentally retarded individuals often exhibit deficiencies in
conceptual skills such as reading and writing, as well as
deficiencies in social skills manifested as gullibility, naivet6, and
the ability to follow rules and avoid victimization. 166 Regardless of
the age at which these limitations became known, they manifest
as an impairment that equally diminishes the retributive and
deterrent effects of the death penalty,167 which the Atkins Court
believed significant enough to warrant the prohibition of capital
punishment for individuals who are mentally retarded.
168
Because the United States Supreme Court held that executing
people with significantly diminished mental capacity qualifying as
mental retardation is unconstitutional, 169 it clearly should still be
unconstitutional to execute someone who met the mental criteria
at the time of their crime, but whose diagnosis simply did not
occur before a certain age.
The age of onset requirement poses further difficulty in that
it is unclear how to determine whether mental retardation began
before age eighteen in an individual who was diagnosed later in
life. 170 Furthermore, the medical purpose of the age of onset
requirement-distinguishing mental retardation from other
164. Id. at 319; see also supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (discussing
retribution and deterrence in relation to the mentally retarded).
165. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
166. AAIDD FAQ, supra note 32; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text (discussing the adaptive limitations of those with mental retardation).
167. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
168. 536 U.S. at 321..
169. Id.
170. Elaine Cassel, Justice Deferred, Justice Denied: The Practical Effect of
Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 51, 57 (2004) ("There is not a systematic
method of determining how someone who is long past eighteen years of age became
mentally retarded prior to reaching the age of eighteen.").
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possible causes of the same symptoms-has no bearing on the
court's inquiry into the fitness of the defendant for the death
penalty.17 ' Since the age at which an individual first experienced
symptoms of mental retardation does not affect his or her fitness
for execution, the Atkins protection against cruel and unusual
punishment mandates that the age of onset requirement be
eliminated from inquiries into mental retardation for purposes of
capital trials. 172
C. The Atkins Court Should Have Cautioned the States
Against Placing Too Much Weight on IQ Scores
The use of IQ test scores in determining mental retardation
has been criticized in several ways. First, it is important to
consider the performance on an IQ test along with the other
indicators of mental retardation, because "[a] simple IQ score
cannot possibly consider the individual as a whole being within his
or her unique life context."'173 An individual's limitations in
adaptive behavior are as important as the performance on an IQ
test, but are more difficult to measure and present as conclusive
evidence in court. 174
Another problem with viewing IQ tests as indicative of
mental retardation is the phenomenon known as the "Flynn
effect."' 175 The Flynn effect refers to the overall improvement of IQ
scores by 5 to 25 points every generation. 176 To compensate for
this phenomenon, IQ tests are renormed 177 every 15 to 20 years to
restore the mean score to 100.178 The result, however, is that
fewer people fall into the range for mental retardation as time
171. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
the age of onset requirement in definitions of mental retardation).
172. See Matthewman, supra note 41, at 3 ("Principles of equal protection, and
protections against cruel and unusual punishment, mandate that ... the 'age of
onset' requirement be eliminated entirely .... ").
173. Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch: Ethical Dilemmas
Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121, 129
(2004).
174. See id. at 130-31.
175. See id. at 127-28; see also Cornell University, Timing of IQ Test Can Be a
Life or Death Matter, SCIENCE DAILY, Dec. 4, 2003,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/12/031204073317.htm.
176. See Cornell University, supra note 175.
177. American Psychological Association, Renorming IQ Tests Due to Flynn
Effect May Have Unintended Consequences, SCIENCE DAILY, Oct. 20, 2003,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/10/031020053951.htm (explaining that
"renorming" means making the IQ tests harder in an amount that will result in a
mean score of 100).
178. See id.; Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 173, at 127.
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increases from each renorming of the IQ test. 179 Because of the
instability in IQ tests caused by the Flynn effect, researchers have
cautioned that some death row inmates who did not originally test
in the range for mental retardation may actually fall in that
range-and in fact have mental retardation-if tested again using
a properly calibrated IQ test. °80  The implications of the
inconsistency in IQ tests for the borderline mentally retarded
individual are huge: it is the difference between life and death. It
is imperative that the use of IQ test scores in determinations of
mental retardation be eliminated or qualified as inconclusive so
that mentally retarded people are no longer put to death due to
the result of one inconsistent test.
Failure to diagnose mental retardation when relying on IQ
test scores is not a mere possibility; it is a reality. One study
found that three times the number of children fell within the
range of mild mental retardation (an IQ score of 66-70) in the first
five years after the test was recalibrated compared to the last five
years before recalibration.18 1 The researchers in that study
advised against the use of IQ scores as a basis for important
financial, social, or legal decisions, noting that when making such
decisions, it may be insufficient to examine only whether or not an
IQ score falls below a cutoff point.18 2 The decision of whether to
sentence a defendant to death or life in prison is one of the most
important legal decisions that our judicial system makes. It
follows that, because the score alone presents an incomplete
picture of mental competency, courts should neither heavily weigh
IQ tests nor view an IQ score as determinative evidence when
making a decision on a defendant's mental retardation.
The most recognized definitions of mental retardation not
only require an examination of adaptive functioning as well as
intellectual ability (or IQ score), but also note that impairments in
adaptive functioning, not low IQ scores, are the chief indicators of
mental retardation.1 8 3 Nevertheless, because an IQ test produces
a quantifiable result in the form of a specific number, it is easy to
use an IQ score to make a threshold determination of mental
retardation. In Ford v. Wainwright, when the Supreme Court left
179. See Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 173, at 127-28.
180. Cornell University, supra note 175.
181. See American Psychological Association, supra note 177.
182. See Cornell University, supra note 175.
183. See State v. Jimenez (Jimenez I), 908 A.2d 181, 184 (N.J. 2006) (citing the
definition of mental retardation from the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-TV) (4th ed.
2000)); see also AAIDD FAQ, supra note 32.
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the procedure for determining insanity to the states, it placed the
highest importance on an accurate determination of the facts. 8 4
The Atkins court claimed to be following the precedent created by
Ford by leaving the task of determining mental retardation to the
states.5 5 Thus, following Ford, the states should place accurate
factual determination above all else, which they fail to do either by
placing too much weight on IQ scores or by neglecting to consider
evidence of adaptive impairment (as in Texas). 186
If the IQ score is used as one prong in the determination of
mental retardation, certain precautions should be taken to ensure
that mentally retarded individuals will not be sentenced to
death. 187 At a minimum, courts should note whether the IQ test
used is at the beginning or the end of a cycle, in order to determine
if the Flynn effect might come into play.' 8 8 Additionally, if the
score from an old IQ test is used, an inquiry should be made to
determine how long after a renorming the test took place. The
longer the period of time since the renorming of the test, the
greater the likelihood that the Flynn effect would cause inflation
in the score.189 The possibility of an artificially raised score should
be grounds for re-testing with a more recently recalibrated test. 190
Alternatively, courts could compensate for the Flynn effect in
the cutoff IQ score that they use to determine mental retardation.
For example, the threshold could increase by a percentage
corresponding to the Flynn effect increase on the overall norm,
either annually or every two years. This may be difficult to
implement, especially with no uniform definition of mental
retardation, but would still be a step toward ensuring that
constitutional violations do not occur.
Because of its inherent limitations, relying on IQ as a
determinative factor is likely to result in the execution of mentally
184. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986); see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing Ford).
185. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405
(1986)).
186. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing that Texas uses its
own factors in lieu of those suggested by the AAIDD or other definitions as
indicative of adaptive impairment.)
187. See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (noting the large potential
for failure to diagnose mental retardation when relying on IQ tests).
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 173, at 127-28 (noting that fewer
people fall into the range for mental retardation as time increases from each
renorming of the IQ test).
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retarded people. 191 The Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia
clearly held that such punishment is cruel and unusual. 192 It is
unfortunate that the states seem to agree on the use of an IQ
threshold, because, as we have seen, IQ tests are inexact
measuring tools and do not take the whole picture of the defendant
into account. 193 Authorities on mental retardation suggest using
IQ tests only as an aid in the measurement of intellectual
functioning, not as a determinative factor in the inquiry into
mental retardation. 1 94 Courts should follow this advice, and either
eliminate the use of IQ tests or lessen their reliance on IQ scores
while compensating for the Flynn effect on any tests used.
D. By Failing to Provide Adequate Procedural Means to
Determine Mental Retardation, the Atkins Decision
Failed to Protect Against Unconstitutional Punishment
Prior to the Atkins decision, eighteen states had enacted
statutes either limiting or banning the execution of mentally
retarded people. 195  After Atkins, eight more states passed
legislation on the issue. 196 Unfortunately, that leaves thirteen
states with the death penalty whose legislatures have yet to
provide a test or method for the courts to use in the six years since
the Atkins ruling by the Supreme Court. 197 As the Texas court
noted in Ex parte Briseno, the courts do not usually create the law,
but are instead supposed to follow the law as enacted by the
191. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
192. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see also supra Part II
(discussing Atkins in detail).
193. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
195. Death Penalty Information Center, State Statutes Prohibiting the Death
Penalty for People With Mental Retardation,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=138&scid (last visited Dec. 17,
2008) (listing Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington as states that had banned the
execution of mentally retarded people prior to Atkins).
196. Death Penalty Information Center, States That Have Changed Their
Statutes to Comply With the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=28&did=668 (last visited Dec. 17,
2008) (noting that states that have updated their statutes are: California,
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, Utah, and Virginia).
197. See Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2008) (noting that, of
the thirty-nine states that have the death penalty, those that have not enacted
legislation are Alabama, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming).
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legislatures. 198 As was the situation in Briseno, lack of sufficient
legislative action has forced some courts to effectively make the
law in this area, 199 creating another layer of inconsistency
amongst the states. To make matters worse, there is no assurance
that the legislation enacted by the states prior to the Atkins
decision in 2002 is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirements outlined in that decision. Even if citizens do
challenge the constitutionality of the older statutes under Atkins,
it is unlikely that they will be overturned because the Atkins
decision gave the states so much discretion.
Comparing Texas, New Jersey, and Louisiana illustrates the
massive irregularities between the states. Texas requires that a
judge decide the issue, whereas New Jersey and Louisiana both
give the task to a jury. 200 Texas, New Jersey, and Louisiana place
the same burden of persuasion on the defendant-a preponderance
of the evidence. 20 1 Alternatively, some states use the clear and
convincing evidence standard, 202 and another requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.203
Atkins made it clear that mentally retarded defendants are
protected from receiving a death sentence by the constitution. 20 4
One scholar noted that, due to this constitutional protection, "[t]he
States' ability to restrict that Eighth Amendment right by placing
a heavy burden of persuasion on the defendant is therefore
constitutionally suspect." 20 5  Based on precedent holding that
States have less latitude when allocating the burden of persuasion
in cases regarding rights derived from the United States
Constitution itself, the scholar concluded that it is a violation of
Due Process for States to assign the defense an elevated burden of
persuasion such as "clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a
198. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4-5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also supra
note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the Briseno court's rationale for
creating a test on its own).
199. See, e.g., supra Part III (discussing how courts in Texas, New Jersey, and
Louisiana had to create new law or interpret new state statutes to comply with
Atkins).
200. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
201. See Gallo v. State, 239 S.W. 3d 757, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v.
Jimenez (Jimenez I1), 908 A.2d 181, 190 (N.J. 2006); State v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89,
93 (La. 2006).
202. See Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 188-89; see also James W. Ellis, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, at 1, 14,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/MREllisLeg.pdf.
203. Jimenez II, 908 A.2d 181, 188-89.
204. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
205. Ellis, supra note 202, at 15.
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reasonable doubt.."206 These considerations cannot be taken lightly
when courts are facing constitutional issues related to cruel and
unusual punishment, in the form of death for a mentally retarded
offender.
In addition to Atkins establishing that mentally retarded
people have constitutional protection against execution, policy
considerations also suggest that the State cannot require a
defendant to bear a heightened burden of proof.20 7 As one scholar
noted, "[tihe State's interest in the fair implementation of its
capital punishment law is considerable, but it does not require the
allocation of such a heavy evidentiary burden on the defendant. '208
The governmental interest does not justify an elevated burden.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court believes that "[a] heightened
standard does not decrease the risk of error, but simply reallocates
that risk between the parties."209 Placing a higher burden on the
defendant does not ensure greater accuracy in determinations of
mental retardation, but merely makes it more likely that, if there
is an error, the harm will be to the defendant rather than to the
government. Consequently, States should not be allowed to
require defendants to meet a heightened burden in order to
demonstrate that they are mentally retarded.
State laws also differ in the timing of the determination of
mental retardation in the criminal process. For example, New
Jersey examines the issue at the close of the guilt-phase of the
trial, but before the sentencing-phase, 210 whereas the default rule
in Louisiana is that the issue of mental retardation is determined
at the sentencing hearing. 211 Not only do these varying practices
result in contradictory application of the Atkins rule from state to
state, but many States also fail to employ sufficient procedural
safeguards to ensure the protection of the constitutional rights of
mentally retarded individuals.
In the 2002 case Ring v. Arizona,212 decided four days after
Atkins, the Supreme Court held that capital defendants have the
right to a jury determination of "all factual questions that are




209. Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996)).
210. State v. Jimenez (Jimenez 1), 908 A.2d 181, 191-92 (N.J. 2006).
211. State v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 93 (La. 2006).
212. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
213. Ellis, supra note 202, at 16.
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Ring, Justice Albin of the New Jersey Supreme Court contends
that, since the State cannot sentence a mentally retarded person
to death, the defendant's lack of mental retardation is equivalent
to a fact that is necessary to increase a sentence from life
imprisonment to death.214 This argument is consistent with other
courts that have pointed out that a finding of mental retardation is
different from other sentencing factors because, if found, it is a
complete bar to the death penalty. 215 Justice Albin believes that
the Supreme Court's decisions in Ring and other cases dealing
with the constitutionality of sentencing procedures make it clear
that "[b]ecause the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a
mentally retarded person, a finding of lack of mental retardation is
a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven by the State
beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence can be
imposed."21 6
Justice Albin proposes that after the guilt phase of a trial, the
State should be required to present additional factual findings in
order to obtain a death sentence. 21 7 He claims that since the court
cannot increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum of
life in prison if the defendant is mentally retarded, lack of mental
retardation is a necessary factor that the state must demonstrate
in order to increase the sentence. 218 If one views lack of mental
retardation as a necessary element of the offense, it follows that
the State cannot shift the burden to the defendant because the
State is required to prove each element. 219
Justice Albin further supports his position by pointing out
that even before sentencing cases like Ring, our judicial system
required a high degree of confidence in the outcome of criminal
cases due to the great potential for loss of freedom. 220 Where the
stakes are much higher, as in a death penalty case, no lesser
standard should apply. A defendant should not be sentenced to
death if there is a reasonable doubt that doing so would be a
violation of the United States Constitution. 221  Therefore, the
214. Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 194-95 (Albin, J., dissenting).
215. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
216. Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 193 (Albin, J., dissenting).
217. Id. ("At that stage [post-conviction, pre-sentencing], without any further
factual finding, the defendant cannot receive a sentence greater than life.").
218. Id. at 194 ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 366, 490 (2000))).
219. Id. (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-702 (1975)).
220. Id. at 193.
221. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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State should bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant lacked mental retardation. 222
The issue of mental retardation should be determined pre-
trial. At a minimum, an early finding that the defendant is
mentally retarded eliminates the need for an exceedingly costly
and time-consuming capital trial.223 Furthermore, after being
qualified and sitting for a capital trial, jurors are more likely
either not to find the defendant mentally retarded, or to ignore the
mental retardation. 224 Because jurors are not well equipped to
deal with the issue of mental retardation, it is dangerous to
combine that dispositive issue with the other issues that the jurors
are instructed to balance, which do not have such high
consequences. This can result in juries simply balancing away the
existence of mental retardation because they think that the
individual should be sentenced to death. 225 Consequently, if juries
are to decide this issue, the proceeding should take place pre-trial,
before the jurors have been swayed by the presentation of other
evidence having nothing to do with mental retardation, and when
they will not be confused by the addition of other sentencing
issues.
Regardless of whether a judge or jury decides the issue of
mental retardation, the court should rely on experts in the field of
mental retardation to aid in its decision-making. The use of a
psychiatrist is not enough, as he or she may be untrained in the
specific field of mental retardation. 226 As noted in Part III.A.
above, the Texas Supreme Court specifically instructed the courts
not to rely solely on the opinion of experts. 227 The Texas court
dismissed the criteria given by the AAMR for determining
limitations in adaptive behavior, and instead came up with its own
criteria. 228
222. Jimenez II, 908 A.2d at 195 (Albin, J., dissenting) ("[A] reasonable doubt
about a defendant's mental retardation must weigh in favor of life.").
223. Ellis, supra note 202, at 13 ("It is universally recognized that capital trials
are vastly more expensive to conduct than noncapital trials.").
224. Cassel, supra note 170, at 57 ("If evidence of mental retardation is
presented at the penalty phase with death qualified jurors, convictions are more
likely.").
225. Id. ("A prosecutor's hope is that a jury committed to sentencing a defendant
to death will 'nullify' and reject a persuasive claim of mental retardation if the facts
of the killing are sufficiently gruesome. Juries in capital cases are already
predisposed to both conviction and execution ... .
226. Ellis, supra note 202, at 11.
227. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the
Briseno opinion on the creation of Texas's test for determining mental retardation).
228. Id.
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This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, it goes
against the holding in Atkins, in which the Supreme Court
recognized mental retardation as a specific condition that renders
those afflicted ineligible for the death penalty. 229  The Atkins
Court in no way suggested that the judge should consider factors
other than those used in common definitions of mental
retardation.230 Second, "few participants in the criminal justice
process-including prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and
juries-understand the nature and significance of mental
retardation."' 23 1 In making a determination that could mean the
difference between life and death for someone, it is simply not
enough for a judge to examine the aspects of the defendant's
condition that he or she sees fit. Thus, those with the greatest
expertise in the field should determine the defining characteristics
of mental retardation.
Moreover, in making its decision in Atkins, the Court
explained that it would mirror the approach to insanity taken by
the Court in Ford v. Wainwright and leave the enforcement of its
holding up to the States. 232  In Ford, the Supreme Court
specifically pointed out the importance of considering multiple
expert psychiatric opinions when determining a defendant's
mental state. 233  Because the Atkins Court applied the
methodology used in Ford, the States should follow the
instructions in the Ford opinion regarding the use of expert
opinions. In this way, Texas blatantly overstepped the bounds of
the Atkins decision by excluding the consideration of expert
opinions. 234 In order to achieve accuracy and consistency, the use
of experts in the field of mental retardation is an essential
component of any judicial inquiry into mental retardation.
E. The Atkins Court Should Have Instructed States to
Focus on the Issues That Are Dispositive as to Whether a
Defendant Can Be Sentenced to Death, Rather Than the
Inexact Task of Labeling Defendants as Mentally
Retarded
Despite placing the task of defining mental retardation in the
229. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
230. See id. at 317-18 (acknowledging the existence of a national consensus on
the scope of mental retardation); see also Ellis, supra note 202, at 5-10.
231. Cassel, supra note 170, at 58.
232. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
233. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414 (1986).
234. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the Briseno
opinion and Texas's test for determining mental retardation).
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hands of judges who have no training in the field of mental
retardation, there is one positive aspect of Texas's approach to this
issue. The Texas court remarked that the purpose of the inquiry
regarding the defendant's mental capacity is to determine
"whether the person is, in fact, mentally retarded for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment ban on excessive punishment."235 This
statement highlights the underlying purpose of a court's
examination of mental retardation, which is to determine whether
the individual meets the criteria for execution, not whether the
individual meets the court's arbitrary definition of mental
retardation.
As explained in the Atkins decision, it is unconstitutional to
execute mentally retarded people for three reasons: they do not
have the requisite culpability; the traditional rationale for
inflicting the death penalty does not apply to them; and, there is a
national consensus against the practice. 236 This illustrates that,
for the purpose of determining whether someone can or cannot be
sentenced to death, describing an individual as mentally retarded
is just another way of saying that they do not meet the necessary
constitutional criteria for infliction of the death penalty. Because
of this, courts and legislatures need not be as concerned with
examining factors that indicate the existence of mental
retardation, 237 as with an analysis of factors indicating whether
the defendant meets the constitutional criteria, established by
Atkins, that are required in order to be sentenced to death. The
Atkins Court cited various reasons that mentally retarded people
do not meet the criteria for the death penalty, including a
diminished capacity to understand, process information,
communicate, premeditate, and deliberate. 238  These are the
characteristics of the defendant that courts should ultimately be
concerned with, rather than the label of mental retardation.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV.D., the criteria should.
not be determined on a state-by-state basis. 239 Instead, the Atkins
Court should have consulted experts in the field of mental
235. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
236. Atkins, 526 U.S. at 306-7. For a discussion of the factors courts should use
to determine the level of culpability and whether retribution and deterrence apply
to the particular defendant, see supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
237. For an example, see supra note 115 and accompanying text, listing the
factors suggested for inquiry by the Texas courts in the discussion of Ex parte
Briseno.
238. See Atkins, 526 U.S at 318-20; see also supra notes 81-94 and
accompanying text (discussing reasons why the Atkins Court decided that the
mentally retarded should not be subject to the death penalty).
239. See supra notes 195-234 and accompanying text.
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retardation in order to determine the traits of a mentally retarded
person that make them ineligible for the death penalty, and how
best to determine if a defendant possesses those traits. Based on
such an analysis, the Court could have formulated a useful rule for
determining whether a defendant meets the mental standards to
be sentenced to death under the United States Constitution,
regardless of the label of mental retardation.
The task of measuring limitations in adaptive behavior, a
component of all common definitions of mental retardation, is
another area that presents significant difficulties in attempting to
determine if an individual is mentally retarded. Despite lower
than average mental capacity, most people with mental
retardation live independently as adults; specifically, "about 87%
of people with mental retardation will only be a little slower than
average. ' 240 Thus, the limitations in adaptive behavior may be
less apparent in these individuals.
Despite its difficulty, a thorough analysis of the existence of
adaptive impairments is very important, because some people with
mental retardation will score above the cutoff IQ score that is set
as the maximum for mental retardation even though they fall
below the mean for adaptive impairments. 241 Additionally, even if
they appear to interact normally, the AAIDD notes that, due to
inherent limitations, individuals with mental retardation are at a
"substantial disadvantage . . . when attempting to function in
society. '242 For example, aggression can be a symptom of mental
retardation, 243 predisposing the mentally retarded to commit
violent crimes. Thorough investigation into adaptive limitations is
thus very important, as such limitations can be difficult to find but
are crucial to an accurate assessment of the individual's mental
capacity.
Determining whether adaptive impairments exist in
incarcerated individuals is particularly difficult. 244 The "structure
240. Definition, supra note 35.
241. See Kimberly A. Meany, Atkins v. Virginia: The False Finding of a National
Consensus and the Problems with Determining who is Mentally Retarded, 11
WIDENER L. REV. 137, 166 (2004) ("Health professionals argue that using a single
cutoff score to determine mental retardation is 'arbitrary, because some children
with mental retardation will score above that number .... "' (quoting Pasquale J.
Accardo & Arnold J. Capute, Mental Retardation, 4 MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 2, 4 (1998))).
242. AAIDD FAQ, supra note 32.
243. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, MENTAL RETARDATION,
http://www.minddisorders.com/Kau-NulMental-retardation.html (last visited Dec.
17, 2008).
244. See Knauss & Kutinsky, supra note 173, at 131.
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and support provided by a prison environment tend to reduce (or
at least alter) the environmental demands placed upon inmates,"
in effect making the individual appear more adapted to the
environment. 245 Additionally, the usual measures of adaptive
functioning have not been normed for use on a correctional
population, nor were they designed for use on individuals in
prison. 246
If an inquiry into mental retardation is to be used to
determine fitness for execution, the standard definition should be
revisited every few years to account for advances in medicine and
knowledge about mental retardation. The definition of mental
retardation is constantly evolving with advances in research,
understanding, and treatment. 247 The AAIDD has revised its
definition of mental retardation ten times since 1908, and it is
likely that the definition will continue to evolve. 248 While it is very
important for the definition of mental retardation to become
uniform among the states, it is more important that the goal of the
inquiry be kept in mind--ensuring that individuals who do not
meet the criteria for the death penalty are not executed.
Accordingly, the definition of mental retardation adopted for use in
death penalty cases should examine the characteristics of
individuals who meet the definition of mental retardation in
conjunction with the characteristics of a criminal mind that are
necessary for imposing the death penalty.
F. Components of an "Atkins" Rule that Would Ensure that
States Do Not Continue to Unconstitutionally Sentence
Mentally Retarded People to Death
A judge should make the determination of mental retardation
in a pre-trial proceeding. 249 If not determined pre-trial, the judge
should still decide the issue because the jury is likely to be biased
in its findings regarding mental retardation once it has heard all
the facts in the capital trial. 250 The defendant should bear the
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See AAIDD FAQ, supra note 32.
248. Id.
249. See Ellis, supra note 202, at 12-13 (noting that most states which have
enacted legislation on the procedure for the determination of mental retardation
have chosen to have a judge decide the issue in a pretrial proceeding). But see State
v. Jimenez (Jimenez II), 908 A.2d 181, 192-96 (N.J. 2006) (Albin, J., dissenting)
(arguing that juries should determine the existence of mental retardation).
250. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
why the determination must take place pre-trial, and why jurors are not well
equipped to make that determination).
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burden of production, but when it is met, the State should be
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
lacked mental retardation. 251 If the burden of persuasion is on the
defendant, it should not be any higher than the preponderance of
the evidence standard. 252 In this proceeding, the court should
make use of experts in the specific field of mental retardation. 253
Any use of IQ score should be adjusted for the Flynn effect and
supplemented by thorough examination of other factors. 254 No age
of onset should be required. 255
The dispositive issue is whether the defendant meets the
requisite criteria for execution as set forth in Atkins, which
requires balancing the mentally retarded defendant's culpability
with the penological purposes served by the death penalty. 256
Thus, the court should determine whether the defendant acted
rationally, purposefully, and deliberately; whether he or she has
the capacity to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct;
whether he or she is able to conform to the behavior of a
responsible mature citizen; the level of personal responsibility; and
whether the individual engaged in premeditation and deliberation
of the crime. 257
If a defendant is not clearly mentally retarded, the court
should weigh the defendant's interest in life against the
government's interest in capital punishment. 25s If executing the
defendant will not legitimately further the interests of retribution
and deterrence, or if the defendant does not have heightened
culpability to warrant the death penalty, the defendant should be
251. See Ellis, supra note 202, at 15-17 (discussing potential constitutional
issues with placing any burden of persuasion on the defense).
252. See supra notes 202-206 and accompanying text (referencing a potential
constitutional issue with placing a heavy burden of persuasion on the defendant,
such as "clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt").
253. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (noting that few participants in
the criminal justice system understand the nature and significance of mental
retardation); see also supra note 233 and accompanying text (referencing the
Supreme Court's decision in Ford, where the Court specifically noted that multiple
expert psychiatric opinions should be considered when determining issues of
mental state).
254. See supra notes 173-194 and accompanying text (discussing the
inaccuracies that can come from placing too much emphasis on the IQ score and
what precautions should be taken to increase accuracy in determining mental
retardation).
255. See Matthewman, supra note 41, at 3.
256. See Atkins v. Virginia, 526 U.S. 304, 306-7 (2002).
257. See Hall, supra note 45, at 376-77.
258. See Ellis, supra note 202, at 15.
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given a maximum sentence of life in prison. 25 9 After balancing
factors such as the severity of the crime against the defendant's
limitations and mental capacity, the courts must conclude both
that the defendant was more morally culpable than the average
criminal and that the rationale behind the death penalty applies
specifically to that defendant in order to increase the sentence
from life in prison to death. 260 Only under these conditions can
the court constitutionally inflict the death penalty under Atkins.
26 1
Conclusion
The only way to ensure that mentally retarded people are not
unconstitutionally sentenced to death is to stop using the death
penalty in the United States for any offender, regardless of mental
capacity. Since this solution does not appear to be on the horizon,
the Supreme Court's holding in Atkins v. Virginia would seem to
be the next best thing; in practice, however, the Atkins decision
leaves much to be desired. Through the use of differing definitions
of mental retardation and procedures for determining who is
mentally retarded, states inconsistently apply the Supreme
Court's holding in Atkins. By allowing the States to create their
own tests, the Atkins rule was insufficient to guard against
constitutional violations. In order to ensure that people are not
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, a single uniform and
vigorous standard for determining mental retardation for capital
punishment purposes is needed. Without such improvements, the
States are free to continue executing those who, because they are
mentally retarded, do not meet the constitutional requirements for
inflicting the death penalty.
It bears repeating that the United States Supreme Court
recognized that "within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." 262  This assertion,
combined with the agreement among many states that sentencing
mentally retarded people to death is a cruel and unusual
punishment, demonstrates that there is both national and global
consensus on this issue. The Atkins decision was a step in the
right direction by formally recognizing that executing mentally
retarded people violates the United States Constitution, but it did
not go far enough. In order to comply with the conclusion shared
259. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 318-21.
262. Id. at 316 n.21 (citation omitted).
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by the Supreme Court, many states, and much of the world, the
United States still needs to establish a method for courts to use to
determine whether defendants meet the constitutional
requirements to qualify for infliction of the death penalty, which
Atkins failed to provide.
A sufficient definition of mental retardation for use in capital
trials would not include an age of onset requirement and would be
updated periodically with advances in the field. Courts should
rely on the use of experts in the specific field of mental retardation
to aid in their determination of the issue, and should not place
heavy emphasis on IQ test scores. Any use of IQ scores should be
carefully monitored to guard against the use of scores that are
artificially heightened due to the Flynn effect. The issue of mental
retardation should be determined pre-trial. Once the defendant
raises the issue of mental retardation, the State should have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
not mentally retarded. These procedural safeguards are necessary
in order to ensure that mentally retarded people are not sentenced
to death in violation of their constitutional rights.
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